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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines and analyzes the nature of work in
the environmental restoration field. The analysis was
conducted using archival and opinion research to define the
unique qualities associated with the engineering and design
phases of the environmental restoration process. Based on
this analysis, justification for the use of cost -reimbursement
contracts for the engineering services used in this field is
provided. The moral hazard/incentive issue associated with
cost -reimbursement contracts is then analyzed. With the moral
hazard issue in mind, Naval Facilities Engineering Command's
(NAVFAC) choice of the cost -plus -award- fee contract for the
Comprehensive Long-Term Environmental Action Navy (CLEAN)
contract is evaluated. This evaluation looks at how the use
of a long-term cost -reimbursement contract, such as CLEAN,
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This thesis was undertaken to investigate three separate
but related issues. The first is the unique nature of
environmental restoration and why cost -reimbursement contracts
are a valid contracting mechanism for attacking this problem.
The second issue is that of moral hazard as a constraining
factor on the use of a cost -reimbursement contract. Finally,
the thesis considers which form of cost -reimbursement contract
is best suited to counter the moral hazard/incentive issue
while still solving the unique problems associated with work
in environmental restoration.
B . BACKGROUND
1. The Growth of Environmental Concerns
Without question, environmental concerns have become,
and will continue to become, an area of growing concern for
the Department of Defense (DoD) . It is only within the
relatively recent past that people have developed a concern
for the long term effects hazardous waste materials have on
the environment. One needs only to read the daily paper to
see some new outrage involving toxic contamination of some
site. Public and legislative opinion has not only grown to
try to stop the contamination of the environment, it is now
mandating the cleanup of all previously contaminated sites.
There was a time when the services could rely on
"Sovereign Immunity" and therefore disregard many federal,
state, and local regulations. While there was knowledge of
toxic sites on government bases, there was little or no
incentive to spend money on any type of remedial action.
Several factors have drastically changed this situation. At
a number of locations, runoff and seepage of toxic
contamination to areas outside bases has caused great concern
in the affected communities. The prospect of defense
reductions, with the corresponding base closures and land
turnovers, has also focused attention on the necessity for
toxic site remediation.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
19 86 (SARA) amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) (also
commonly called Superfund) to make it applicable to all
federal agencies, including DoD. Today there are 154 acts,
200 federal regulations, and many state regulations, all of
which apply to DoD as well as civilian areas. (Griffin, 1991,
p. 5) The government can no longer rely on sovereign immunity
when it comes to the environment and the cleanup of
contaminated sites.
DoD's concern about environmental compliance has
therefore increased drastically over the past several years.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has stated on numerous
occasions that environmental restoration is one of the top
priorities within DoD. This is reflected in the Navy's
Environmental, Natural and Cultural Resources Program Goals,
which lists as one of it's objectives:
"Clean-up Navy shore activities at which past waste
disposal practices have resulted in the potential for
contamination of ground water and adverse health effects
to the general population." (NEESA, 1991, pg. 4)
2 . Size and Cost of Environmental Problem
It is almost unanimously agreed that the costs of
environmental compliance will be staggering. By far the
largest and most expensive area is the restoration of
contaminated sites on DoD installations. There is currently
no firm dollar value for the restoration of these contaminated
sites, although some estimates are in the hundreds of billion
dollars. Spending on the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program (DERP) has increased 600 percent since it was
established in 1984. From an initial budget of $159 million,
DERP funding reached $1.1 billion in 1991, with over $1.3
billion proposed in the 1992 budget. (Ichniowski, April 1,
1991, pg. 26)
Many experts point out that this is only the tip of
the iceberg. The Defense Department recently added 3000 new
military base sites to the toxic cleanup list. This
represents a 21 percent increase and brings the total number
of contaminated sites to 17,482 on 1,855 military
installations. (Ichniowski, April 1, 1991, pg. 26) Gary-
Cohen, with the Boston-based National Toxic Campaign Fund, is
not sure even this new figure accurately reflects the size of
the actual problem. As he states;
"the problem is even worse than we imagined. . . virtually
every major base, and many minor ones, have serious
contamination problems." (The Washington Post, March 29,
1991, pg. A8)
The problem of environmental restoration on such a
huge scale is not a simple one. The answer is not simply, as
many environmentalists propose, throwing huge amounts of money
at the problem. This is especially true in light of the
current and projected decline in the DoD budget. As
Representative Richard Ray, Chairman of the Environmental
Restoration Panel of the House Armed Services Committee, says,
"DoD needs a balanced approach to waste cleanup and
minimization." (Ray, 1990, pg. 11) He suggests an approach
using common sense, fiscal responsibility, and accountability
for the cleanup of environmental problems generated over the
past 50 years.
Given the dollars involved and the political
sensitivity of environmental restoration, it should be obvious
that an extremely effective plan of attack is needed. This
thesis will provide the justification and insight needed to
make sound decisions concerning that plan.
3 . Environmental Regulations
As stated earlier, in 1986 SARA amended CERCLA to
cover all federal agencies, including DoD. CERCLA regulates
both the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and all releases of
hazardous substances into the environment. (Both past and
present.) The regulation which actually implements the
statutory requirements of CERCLA is 40 CFR 300, National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, more
commonly referred to as the National Contingency Plan (NCP)
.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for
implementing all CERCLA provisions.
Hazardous substances are defined by the Clean Water
Act (CWA) and CERCLA as chemicals which are harmful to aquatic
life or the environment. CERCLA regulates the cleanup of
these substances if more than the reportable quantities, as
defined by EPA, are spilled or otherwise released into the
environment
.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of
1976, defines hazardous wastes based on levels of reactivity,
ignitability, corrosivity, or toxicity. RCRA, however, is
concerned only with the day-to-day management and disposal of
these wastes . CERCLA regulates the cleanup when they have
been dumped or spilled in the environment.
4. Environmental Restoration Process
Environmental restoration consists of the
identification, investigation, design of a plan of action, and
the actual cleanup of contaminated sites. The nature of the
exact contamination is not important for purposes of this
thesis. The contamination could be due to any of the
hazardous wastes or hazardous substances defined by CERCLA.
The site could be the result of years of dumping, underground
migration from a leaking tank, or a recent spill. This thesis
is only concerned with the fact that a site is contaminated
and needs to be cleaned up.
Environmental restoration encompasses much more than
the actual physical cleanup of a contaminated site. In fact,
the cleanup itself is often the simplest and quickest part of
the process. The larger problem is defining the scope of
work, designing a cleanup procedure, and getting the design
through the regulatory process. The time required to get a
project from discovery of the site, to design approval, can be
anywhere from four to six years. (Rispoli, 1991, pg. 45) This
thesis will be limited to the design and regulatory portion of
the environmental restoration process because this is where
cost-plus contracts are most appropriate.
DoD manages environmental restoration through its
Installation Restoration Program (IRP or IR Program) . The IRP
was established in 1984 as a comprehensive program to help
identify, investigate, and cleanup contaminated sites on DoD
installations. The program consists of the following seven
steps:
a. Site Discovery
A Commanding Officer (CO) must immediately notify
the National Response Center (NRC) ' when he becomes aware of
a hazardous substance spill. This CERCLA reporting
requirement does not distinguish between an accidental spill
and a dump site which has existed for years, and is suddenly
found to contain hazardous substances. Under site discovery,
the CO is also required to review installation records to
uncover existing toxic sites which have not been reported.
Notification requirements are not fully met until the CO
forwards a Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI)
report to the EPA and state regulatory agencies.
Jb. Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI)
The goal of the PA/SI is to identify potential
hazardous waste sites. The PA is the initial step. It is
developed from readily available existing information which
details installation activities and land uses. It should
include (1) identification of the source and nature of a
release, (2) an estimate of the magnitude of the potential
threat, and (3) a discussion on what will be needed to
'NRC's are communication centers connecting activities
related to hazardous waste releases or response actions.
determine if immediate removal is necessary. (CNO, 1988, pg.
5) The PA will also include a statement about whether
additional investigation is required.
If additional investigation is required, a site
inspection (SI) will be conducted. The SI will consist of a
site visit during which limited samples will be taken. These
samples will be analyzed to verify the findings of the PA.
The entire PA/SI report is then sent to the EPA and state
regulatory agencies.
Information from the PA/SI report is used by the
EPA to rank the site under a Hazard Ranking System (HRS) . The
hazard ranking system uses a mathematical model to score
hazardous waste sites based on the potential risks the
contaminants present to people and the environment. Sites
receiving a score of 2 8.5 or higher are placed on the National
Priorities List (NPL) , where they will receive the highest
priority within the Installation Restoration Program.
c. Coordination With Regulatory Agencies and the
Public
Once the initial investigation has been completed,
CERCLA requires that all regulatory agencies and the public be
given the opportunity to review and comment on the results of
any assessment or study. This is important because CERCLA now
allows any citizen to sue any federal agency which "...is
alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, or order" enacted under CERCLA. (CNO,
1988, pg. 9) The government can have these lawsuits dismissed
if it acts to comply with the CERCLA requirement in question
within 60 days of being notified of the suit. This aspect of
CERCLA highlights the political environment in which DoD is
operating. Coordination with regulatory agencies and the
public is a continual and critical requirement throughout the
restoration process.
d. Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS)
Sites which are identified in the PA/SI as posing
potential threats to humans or the environment require further
investigation and study. A Remedial Investigation (RI) will
then be conducted to determine the nature and extent of
contamination at the site. Detailed water, soil, and air
samples are taken to define the exact contaminates, their
concentrations, and their migration path. The RI also
includes a health assessment to evaluate possible risks to the
public and the environment.
Based on data collected during the RI, a
feasibility study (FS) evaluates potential remedial
alternatives based on effectiveness and cost. Protection of
public health and the environment will be paramount with any
option considered, however.
e. Record of Decision (ROD)
A Record of Decision (ROD) must be prepared to
document the cleanup option selected and the justification and
rationale behind it. The ROD must be made available to the
public for comment and criticism. Public concerns must be
responded to prior to any further remedial action.
f. Remedial Design
Once the most appropriate cleanup method is
selected and approved, a design is drawn up. This will
provide the job specific procedures and requirements based on
the cleanup procedure selected and the actual site conditions.
g. Remedial Action
The remedial design will stipulate the job specific
procedures to be used during the actual cleanup. The type of
contract used will depend on the exactness of the
specifications and the amount of uncertainty which still
surrounds the work. For sites on the NPL, CERCLA requires
that the remedial work commence within 15 months of completion
of the ROD.
It should be obvious from the steps described above
that there is much more involved in environmental restoration
than simply contracting for the actual cleanup. Fulfilling
the requirements of the regulatory process, from site
discovery through the design phase, typically takes from four
10
to six years. This process takes so long because there is
extensive regulatory involvement at each step. Every
investigation, plan, study, and design is reviewed. A
regulatory agency, either federal, state, or local, can reject
any of these submissions if it does not satisfy their own
requirements or regulations. Approval to move to the next
phase is not given until all regulatory agencies have approved
the documents required in the preceding step.
5. Comprehensive Long-Term Environmental Action Navy
(CLEAN)
The cost -plus -award- fee contract is one of five types
of cost -reimbursement contracts. Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) made the decision several years ago to use
cost -plus -award- fee contracts to attack the Navy's
environmental restoration problem. The actual contract NAVFAC
has developed for this problem is the Comprehensive Long-Term
Environmental Action Navy (CLEAN) contract.
The CLEAN contract purchases engineering services from
discovery through the design phase of the restoration process.
Because the CLEAN contractor is selected using Brooks Act
provisions 2
,
he is limited to providing engineering services
2The Brooks Architect -Engineers Act of 1949 was
established to allow the government freedom in selecting
engineering services. Engineering services can be contracted
for on the basis of technical competence without having to go
through a competitive bidding process requiring mandatory
selection of the lowest bidder.
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and can not perform any of the actual cleanup. There are,
however, provisions which allow the CLEAN contractor to
perform interim remediation in emergency situations.
The CLEAN contractor performs almost all of the
functions needed to ensure the Navy stays in compliance with
all federal, state, and local environmental laws. This
includes, but is certainly not limited to, conducting the
assessments, studies, and investigations previously described;
preparing environmental permits; preparing environmental
planning documents; performing field and laboratory tests;
coordinating with regulatory agencies; and preparing remedial
designs. (NAVFAC, 1990, pg. 2) The special provisions
mentioned earlier also allow the contractor to perform
emergency spill response and cleanup.
CLEAN contracts have been awarded, or are about to be
awarded, at all six of the Navy's Engineering Field Divisions
(EFD) . Each has a performance period of one base year plus
nine option years. Based on the contractor's performance, the
Navy will decide at the end of each year whether the next
option year should be exercised. Each of the CLEAN contracts
has an estimated value of between $100 and $130 million.
(Rispoli, 1991, pg. 45) The amount of funding authorized




This thesis was conducted using archival and opinion
research to define the environmental problem, validate the use
of cost -reimbursement contracts in the environmental area, and
investigate the moral hazard associated with cost -type
contracts. No statistical, survey, or numerical data is used.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The engineering, design, and regulatory portion of
environmental restoration covered by CLEAN contracts is the
longest phase of the work, and is an area highly susceptible
to scope and price uncertainties. This makes it an ideal area
for evaluating the utility of the cost-plus contract.
Even though NAVFAC has shifted to the use of cost-
reimbursement contracts for the engineering and design work
required in the environmental area, there is no single
comprehensive justification for this shift. This thesis will
provide that single source justification. It will investigate
the two basic types of contracts, firm- fixed-price and cost-
reimbursement, to determine which is better suited for this
work.
The unique nature of environmental design work will be
investigated to explain why traditional NAVFAC contracting
mechanisms are not always suitable for environmental
restoration. Other contracting mechanisms (indefinite
quantity, and time and material contracts) are still available
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to NAVFAC in the environmental restoration area. However,
difficulties quantifying the effort required in environmental
work, particularly in the engineering and design area, have
required a shift in emphasis to cost -reimbursement contracts.
Also, these other contracts represent only a small percentage
of contracts, are limited to specific situations, and fall
into the two broad categories of contracts which will be
investigated.
The moral hazard/incentive problem inherent in cost-
reimbursement contracts will also be investigated. Each of
the five different type cost -reimbursement contracts will be
studied to determine which is best suited for controlling the
moral hazard problem. Beyond the justification for a cost-
reimbursement contract, this analysis will provide specific
justification for NAVFAC s use of a cost-plus-award- fee
contract for the CLEAN.
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II. CONTRACT TYPES
A. CONTRACTS AND RISK
A contract is a legal agreement between two parties. It
stipulates that one party will provide some product or service
to the other party for some form of compensation. A goal of
any contract is improve the utility of each party. Another
goal, for each party, will be to effect the transaction at the
lowest ultimate cost. For the party writing the contract, the
lowest ultimate cost will include both the actual cost of the
product or service and the cost of writing and administering
the contract. For the contractor, the lowest ultimate cost
will be a combination of the risk he will assume and the
expected cost of the work. The type of contract and terms of
the contract are subject to negotiation between the parties
before it is signed. Both the type and terms of the contract
are determined by the nature of the endeavor being undertaken
and the risks associated with successful completion.
Risk, and who bears what portion of the risk, is a crucial
issue in negotiating a contract. Risk can be defined as the
possibility of suffering harm or loss due to the stochastic
character of the product to be delivered or the conditions
defining delivery. There is always the risk that
uncertainties in the form of difficulties or events will occur
15
during the performance of the contract which were not foreseen
at the time of contracting.
Specifically, this thesis will deal with events and
conditions which result in cost risk of performance. This is
the risk that the contract work will cost more than the amount
agreed to when the contract was signed. Cost risk is caused
by the uncertainties inherent in estimating the cost of
contract work. The final cost of the contract will directly
determine the profit, or loss, which the contractor
experiences. Cost risk is important because it is related to
this final profit or loss, and one of the fundamental business
motivations is to maximize profits.
The cost risk of performance affects contracts in two
ways. First, the more cost risk the contractor takes on, the
more cost -conscious he should be. Secondly, however, it can
be said that defense contractors are basically risk averse.
(Pitts, 1968, p. 94) This means they will avoid risk unless
they are compensated for accepting it. This compensation will
have to exceed the expected payoff to entice the risk averter
into accepting the risk.
A risk averter is an individual whose utility function is
concave. This means that the marginal utility of money
declines over the entire relevant range. (Diminishing
marginal utility) Put another way, the risk averter would
prefer a perfectly certain investment over an equal, but less
certain, return. Before a risk averter will accept risk, such
16
as cost risk of performance, he must be given a risk premium
to compensate for the loss of utility due to the risk itself.
The amount of the risk premium will depend on the individual's
utility function. (Levy and Sarnat, 1982, pp. 205-209) The
risk averter will typically not accept risk without both some
limit on loss and acceptable levels of anticipated
compensation.
B. CONTRACT TYPES
Government contracts fall in one of two broad categories
as defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part
16. They are firm- fixed-price (FFP) and cost -reimbursement
contracts. The basic difference between a FFP and cost-
reimbursement contract is the degree to which responsibility
is assumed by the contractor for the cost of performance.
Another way of stating this is: who does the cost risk of
performance rest with?
1. Firm- Fixed- Price Contracts (FFP)
With the FFP contract, the price is set up front,
usually by use of a competitive sealed bidding process. The
contractor agrees to. provide a product or service for the
fixed price. If the contractor fails to provide this product
or service, he is not entitled to payment. (The government
must always pay for any value it has received, however.)
Since the price is fixed prior to the start of work,




are the responsibility of the contractor. If costs run
higher than anticipated, profit will decrease, or there could
be a loss. Conversely, if costs run less then expected, the
contractor's profit will increase. In this way, the FFP
contract places the maximum cost risk on the contractor.
A contractor will accept a FFP contract because, based
on the statement of work and the contract specifications which
describe exactly what is required, he should be able to
accurately estimate his own costs for performing the work. If
anything arises after contract award which is not included in
the contract, a modification must be processed compensating
the contractor for the additional work. The contractor's cost
risk is thereby limited to only those items which were
specifically spelled out in the contract.
Because the scope and responsibilities are
specifically defined in a FFP contract, contractors can
measure the risk they will be assuming. The contractor can
therefore submit his bid weighing the profit he would like to
receive against the competitive environment of the sealed
bidding process. When a contractor's bid is accepted by the
government, usually because it is the lowest, the contractor
is committed to that price. His profit will depend on how
well he manages his own costs. The FFP contract should
therefor provide the greatest incentive for efficient and
economical performance by the contractor.
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a. When To Use Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts
Because of the cost risk placed on the contractor,
the government has to be sensitive to how and when the FFP
contract is used. It should be limited to situations where
well defined specifications are available, where costs can be
fairly accurately estimated, and where the risks are minimal
or can be estimated with some degree of certainty. (FAR Part
16, 1989, p. 16-1)
2. Cost -Reimbursement Contracts
Cost -reimbursement (also called cost-plus and cost-
type) contracts transfer the cost risk of performance from the
contractor to the government. They do this by providing that
the contractor be paid for all reasonable, allocable, and
allowable costs incurred, up to the funding limit, while
trying to perform the contract work. The funding limit is
based on the estimated cost of the product or service, which
is agreed to prior to the start of work.
There is no obligation on the contractor's part to
actually produce a product or provide a service. He agrees
only to use his best effort in an attempt to provide these
things. He will work toward this goal until the government
directs him to stop, or he reaches the pre-established funding
limit
.
If the contractor has not fulfilled the requirements
of the contract when the obligated funds have been spent, he
19
is required, by law, to stop work. At that time, the
government can either end the project or authorize additional
funds
.
It is in this way that the government assumes the
entire cost risk of performance under a cost -type contract.
The contractor is guaranteed he will be paid for the work he
performs, regardless of whether anything is actually provided.
At the same time, the government is committed to paying all
contractor expenses regardless of whether it actually receives
any benefit.
a. When To Use Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
Because the entire cost risk of performance rests
with the government, cost -reimbursement contracts should be
used only after careful study has determined they are
appropriate for a given situation. They are very useful, and
in fact necessary, in situations where there are major
uncertainties involved in the work which make it impossible,
or overly expensive, for a contractor to provide a fixed-price
for the work. Typically, a cost -reimbursement contract will
be used when there is a relatively broad statement of work and
there is a desire for the contractor to be both creative and
flexible in attacking the problem. (Administration of Cost-
Reimbursement Contracts, 1991, p. 1-1) In these situations,
the government must assume the cost risk of performance by
using some form of cost -reimbursement contract.
20
Jb. Restrictions on Cost -reimbursement Contracts
Anytime a contractor works without cost risk there
should be a concern about lack of incentive to control costs.
This is understandable in that the contractor will suffer no
ill effects if costs are not kept under control and the job
overruns. This is at the heart of the moral hazard/incentive
issue which will be discussed in the next chapter. Concerns
about this issue have resulted in FAR restrictions on the use
of cost -reimbursement contracts. FAR Part 16.301-3 limits the
use of cost -reimbursement contracts to situations where:
a. The contractor's accounting system is adequate for
determining what costs are applicable to the contract;
b. Sufficient government surveillance is available during
performance to ensure efficient and effective cost control
measures are used; and
c. A Determination and Finding has been conducted showing
that (1) the cost -reimbursement contract will likely be
less expensive than any other type contract, or (2) it is
impractical to obtain the product or service required
without the use of a cost -reimbursement contract.
These limitations are placed on the use of cost -reimbursement
contracts to ensure that they are only used when necessary,
and only when conditions are such that the government has the
ability to monitor the contractor to help ensure efficiency.
21
III. MORAL HAZARD
A. CONCERNS WITH COST- REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS
There is a general mistrust of cost -type contracts within
NAVFAC. This mistrust is not entirely without merit. There
is a genuine concern about efficient and effective use of
limited funds when using a contract that places the cost risk
of performance squarely on the government. It is also
understandable that there would be a certain amount of
apprehension with any contract under which stupidity,
ignorance, incompetence, and possibly even deceit are all
reimbursable
.
The concern with cost -reimbursement contracts is that the
contract creates mixed and possibly conflicting incentives for
the contractor. Under a basic cost -reimbursement contract the
contractor is assured payment for all allowable and allocable
costs he incurs. This includes mistakes and miscalculations
made by the contractor. Unless the government can prove fraud
or willful misconduct, the contractor will be paid for the
work he does, regardless of whether the government actually
receives any product, service, or value. Thus, a contractor
may not be solely motivated to perform the work in an
economical and cost efficient manner.
22
These concerns are a special case of a quite general
economic issue: the principal -agent problem. This is the
problem of economic incentives, information availability, and
absence of control by the principal . The problem centers
around how one party, the principal, can design a contract
(compensation system) which motivates another party, the
agent, to act in the principal's interests. (The New
Palgrave, 1987, p. 966) This problem cannot be avoided
because it is associated with work that is usually too
complicated or too costly for the principal to perform
himself. He must therefor hire an agent with specialized
skills or knowledge to perform the work. (Sappington, 1991, p.
45) The principal, however, is then dependent on the actions
of the agent, who has a great deal more knowledge and
information about the area in question.
The principal -agent problem manifests itself because the
principal must rely on the actions of the agent, but he has
imperfect information and therefore does not know exactly what
action the agent has taken, or should take in a particular
situation. Because the agent is trying to maximize his own
pay-off, his actions will often not be the same as those which
would be preferred by the principal. Because of the
information asymmetry and the fact the agent is trying to
maximize his own utility, there is an incentive for him to act
opportunistically. The actions he takes will be in his own
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interest, and not those of the principal. This is how the
principal -agent problem boils down to an economic incentive
problem.
The information asymmetry is compounded by the fact that
the actions of the agent, or the information on which his
actions are based, are often difficult to observe. A possible
remedy for this problem is to monitor the actions of the
agent, use this information to evaluate his performance, and
tie his reward to his performance. This should penalize
dysfunctional behavior. The problem with this solution is
that full monitoring of the contractor is either impossible or
prohibitively costly. (Holmstrom, 1979, p. 74) Even when
full monitoring of the agent is feasible, the information
asymmetry often means that the principal does not know whether
the action was appropriate or in his best interest. (The New
Palgrave, 1987, pp. 966-971)
The problem then becomes one of trying to design a
contract which will motivate the agent to act in the interest
of the principal. The motivation is provided by the use of
incentives placed in the contract. This can be a difficult
problem considering the nature of a cost -reimbursement
contract; the contractor is not held responsible for




The principal -agent problem is often referred to as the
moral hazard problem. (The New Palgrave, 1987, pp. 967) The
New Palgrave, A Dictionary of Economics , defines moral hazard
as;
"..actions of economic agents in maximizing their own
utility to the detriment of others, in situations where
they do not bear the full consequences or, equivalently,
do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to
uncertainty and incomplete or restricted contracts which
prevent the assignment of full damages (benefits) to the
agent responsible" (The New Palgrave, 19 87, p. 549)
This definition describes the classic case of moral hazard
in an insurance contract. Once an individual (agent) is
insured, there is a danger his actions will not reflect the
best interests of the insurer (principal) . As an example, a
homeowner who purchases theft insurance may become less
careful about locking his doors at night. This is because he
is economically protected by the insurance. The Palgrave
definition accurately reflects the situation when the
government (principal) hires a contractor (agent) to perform
work under a cost -reimbursement contract. Because of the risk
sharing considerations discussed earlier, the cost-
reimbursement contract is used to protect the contractor from
financial loss due to uncertainties inherent in environmental
work. This can be viewed as economic insurance for the
contractor. The danger is that once the contractor is
protected from the cost risks of a contract he will have
little or no incentive to control costs. The contractor will
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also be less likely to disclose information or make unbiased
reports to the principal about matters which might affect his
reward. It is impossible to insulate the contractor from the
cost risks caused by uncertainties without also protecting him
from the consequences of their own actions. (The New Palgrave,
1987, p. 549)
What this means is that the government must find a way to
motivate the contractor to perform as they would themselves if
they were doing the work. The different types of cost-
reimbursement contracts will be discussed and evaluated as to
their effectiveness in providing motivation, or incentives, to
the contractor so that he will act in the desired manner.
C. MORAL HAZARD IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD
The nature of environmental restoration lends itself to
the moral hazard, or principal -agent
,
problem which was
described above. There is imperfect information about what
will be required on any particular job. (This issue will be
addressed more fully in the next chapter.) There is also a
great deal of information asymmetry between the contractor and
the government. This is not in itself bad, and in fact is the
reason the contractor was selected; the government did not
have the knowledge or expertise to do the work itself. This
fact, however, means that the contractor will have information
about the site, and the extent of the cleanup, which the
government will not necessarily be aware of. This information
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can affect all aspects of the remediation process, from the
extent and cost of the cleanup to the liability for the work
once it is complete.
Chapter IV will discuss the nature of environmental
restoration and which type of contract is best suited to
handle this problem. The moral hazard issue is one which
cannot be ignored in this analysis. In light of the
information asymmetry, how will the different contract types
motivate the contractor? Would a FFP contract encourage the
contractor to point out additional cleanup requirements
discovered during his testing? How would the contractor be
motivated in a similar situation if working under a cost -type
contract? Pro and con arguments can be made for both types of
contract. The answer to these questions, however, will depend
to a large degree on the attitudes of the individuals
monitoring and evaluating the contractor's performance.
While the moral hazard issue is important and should be
considered when selecting a contract type for environmental
restoration, it is not the only consideration. The fit of the
contract with the unique aspects of environmental restoration
will be even more important. The moral hazard issue will
therefor be addressed only as it pertains to providing
incentives to a contract once the contract type is selected.
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROBLEM
A. ENVIRONMENTAL AREA
Historically, NAVFAC has used some type of FFP contract to
accomplish most of the responsibilities it is assigned. These
responsibilities include maintenance of naval installations
and the facilities on them, and the construction of new
facilities through the Military Construction (MILCON) program.
While cost -reimbursement contracts were used, they represented
only a small portion of NAVFAC contracts.
New requirements and responsibilities for cleaning up
environmental problems have now been added to NAVFAC s docket.
The addition of the environmental restoration problem has
required NAVFAC to look into contracting mechanisms different
from those favored in the past . Many people have looked at the
IR program as a simple construction problem. They therefor
conclude that the best contracting mechanism would be the
traditional FFP contract. While hazardous waste cleanups do
include many activities which are fundamental to construction,
there are also several unique features which make
environmental remediation very different.
1. Unique features of Environmental Cleanup
There are five features which make work on
environmental remediation different from the standard
28
construction projects with which NAVFAC has historically-
dealt. Each of these five unique features will be
investigated here.
a. Uncertainties in the Scope of Work
The most difficult problem when dealing with
environmental restoration is an inability to define the scope
of work. This is due to the inherent uncertainties associated
with toxic contamination. It is relatively easy to determine
that a site is contaminated, but determining the extent of the
contamination is another matter. Many toxic sites are either
buried dumps or areas where some liquid contaminate has seeped
or migrated through the ground. In these cases, the area
requiring remedial action is at least partially underground.
It is difficult to determine the nature, concentration, and
extent of this underground contamination until it is actually
excavated. Also, a dump site may contain dozens of different
toxic materials, each of which has to be cleaned up using
different methods. It is usually difficult and expensive to
determine which of these materials exist until the contractor
actually encounters them during the clean-up.
In order to accurately define the scope of a
cleanup, repeated and extensive soil sampling and analysis
would have to be carried out. These tests would be both
expensive and require considerable delays. Even after
extensive tests, there is no guarantee that some new material
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or migration path will not be discovered once the remedial
action is started. In the environmental restoration area, the
nature of the uncertainties are unknown, but their existence
is an accepted reality.
A good example of the uncertainties involved in
environmental restoration has been the removal and cleanup of
underground storage tanks. Thousands of these tanks, many
over 50 years old, exist on government installations. Often,
it is difficult to determine if the tanks are leaking or even
what was originally stored in them. Borings 3 can be taken in
the surrounding soil to see if it is contaminated, but the
results of these borings can only give a very rough idea of
the extent of the contamination. The problem is that the
plume of leaking toxins from an underground tank will take
unpredictable paths based on the makeup of the soil and
material under the surface. Another problem is that old
underground tanks sometimes disintegrate as they are lifted
out of the ground. There is no way of determining if this
will occur until the tank is actually removed. For these
reasons, it is often impossible to define the exact scope of
a tank cleanup until the job is well underway.
Most areas in environmental restoration are similar
to the underground tank problem in that it is impossible to
define the scope and level of effort required until the job is
3 Borings are holes drilled in the soil to determine the
nature and content of the material below the surface.
30
actually complete. From above ground, sites can look very-
similar. What is of interest, however, is located
underground. This points out the problem faced in defining
the scope of environmental restoration projects.
b. Changing Regulations
The regulations governing the cleanup of
environmental contaminants have been changing at a breakneck
pace. Within the decade the Navy has gone from being able to
rely on sovereign immunity to being under the jurisdiction of
all federal, state, and local environmental regulations. Even
since DoD has had to comply with these regulations, the
regulations themselves have changed. Old regulations have
been made more stringent, and new regulations have been
implemented which put more constraints on when, how, and to
what extent toxic sites must be cleaned up. (Pawlisch, 1991)
The constantly changing environmental legislation and
regulatory climate also make it difficult to accurately
estimate costs during the restoration process. If regulations
change halfway through a study, or an actual cleanup, work may
have to be stopped and redone in order to meet the new
requirements
.
c. New Information and Technology-
Much of the change in regulatory requirements is
the result of the rapid improvement in measurement technology
in the area of toxic waste. As the ability to measure smaller
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and smaller quantities of toxic materials increases, the
regulations often change to make this the new standard for
cleanup.
Technological advancements can also greatly assist
in the actual cleanup effort. Remediation technology is
continually developing and improving. As new information and
techniques become available, the successful contractors will
be those who are innovative and aggressive in implementing
these items.
d. Different Areas Enforce Regulations to Different
Degrees
Regulators may require two toxic sites, similar in
many ways but located in different areas, to be cleaned up to
different standards based on the location of the site.
(Pawlisch, 1991) This is understandable to a certain degree.
You would expect a populated site in Orange County or San
Diego, to be cleaned up more completely than a similar site
located in Twenty Nine Palms or Yuma, AZ. Intangibles like
this can not be included in a contract, however.
e. Different Regulators Will Emphasize and Enforce
Regulations to Different Degrees
Even within the same organization and geographic
area, individual regulators will have different personalities
and emphasize and require different items. (Pawlisch, 1991)
Within a local EPA office, certain individuals will have
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different backgrounds and different levels of expertise. One
regulator might have a background in water quality and
therefore stress that aspect of an environmental cleanup plan.
The regulator at the next desk may have a background in soils,
and emphasize that area while almost ignoring the water
quality aspects of the job. There is no way of predicting
which regulator will review and approve any particular plan or
design. Since these regulators have the authority to reject
proposed alternatives or require unexpected revisions, it is
important to recognize the uncertainty they introduce. This
again, however, is an intangible which is difficult to predict
and put in a contract.
2 . Unique Features and Contract Type
The five issues raised above highlight some of the
major differences between environmental restoration work and
typical construction. All five represent some form of
uncertainty which makes it difficult or impossible to
accurately estimate costs or even the level of effort that
will be required.
The uncertainties and possible contingencies in
environmental restoration are numerous. The exact nature,
extent of work required, regulatory requirements, and
technologies available can not be predicted at the time of
contracting. The cost of trying to anticipate each one of
these items and including it in the contract would be
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prohibitive. There is a point where the uncertainties are so
great, and the probability of any particular event so small,
that it is better to leave the contract vague and agree to
price after the uncertainties are resolved. (The New Palgrave,
1987, pg. 549) This is exactly what a cost -reimbursement
contract does.
If a FFP contract were used, the contractor would
assume the entire cost risk of performance. He would
therefore base his estimate on a worst case scenario and bid
accordingly. The bid price would reflect a huge risk premium
to compensate the contractor for assuming the cost risk of
performance. This would not be a problem if using a cost-
reimbursement contract because the government would pay for
only the level of effort actually required. Only those
uncertainties, contingencies, and regulations which are
actually encountered or required will be included in the
contract price. This should result in lower costs under a
cost -reimbursement contract, as compared to FFP, because
possible contingencies will not be included in a bid, and will
not be included in the contract price unless they are actually
encountered.
Another major disadvantage of using a FFP contract for
the engineering work involved in environmental restoration
would be the exorbitant number of contract modifications. It
has already been established that the uncertainties can not be
determined when writing the contract, and would therefore have
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to be left out. This would mean that a contract modification
would have to be negotiated each time an uncertainty or
changed condition was encountered.
Contract modifications have a number of drawbacks.
There are financial, administrative, and time costs with
almost all modifications. They are extremely time consuming
for both the government and the contractor. Work is often
stopped until the problem area can be investigated, the scope
and price negotiated, and direction provided to the
contractor. Until the contract is officially modified, the
contractor can not legally proceed with the changed work.
This takes administrative effort and can substantially delay
a project.
Another serious problem with contract modifications is
the lack of competition. When an unforseen site condition
surfaces after contract award, the contractor is the sole
source for resolving the problem. This can lead to many
ramifications, one of the most serious being that the
contractor no longer has any motivation to provide competitive
prices for the work covered by the modification. In the
environmental restoration area, where there is little question
there will be unforseen conditions encountered, the problems
associated with contract modifications must be seriously
considered.
A cost -reimbursement contract has the advantage that
if uncertainties do surface, the contractor can be given
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immediate direction on how to proceed. Work does not have to
stop and the administrative, financial, and time costs of a
contract modification can be avoided.
The use of a FFP contract would not only increase the
number of contract modifications, it would also increase the
number of contractor claims. The courts are full of claims
filled against the government under FFP contracts. FFP
contracts consistently comprise approximately 80 percent of
all contract types submitted for claim with The Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . (Ashhurst, 1983, p. 3) The
leading contract issue in these claims involves the Changes
clause. This is the same clause that would most likely to be
used whenever uncertainties were encountered during the
environmental restoration process.
It is easy to see how an area as ambiguous as
environmental restoration would generate an even greater
number of claims if a FFP contract was used. Cost-
reimbursement contracts, on the other hand, rarely result in
litigation. Since the government agrees from the start to pay
all costs incurred, there is no need for the contractor to
make claims for payment
.
A cost -reimbursement contract would also allow the
contractor to be much more flexible. If regulations changed,
as they have been, a cost -reimbursement contract would allow
the contractor to immediately, and with minimal cost, redirect
his effort towards satisfying the new regulations. If a FFP
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contract were used, the government would still pay for any new
requirements, as well as the costs of contract modifications.
Innovation could also be encouraged through the use of
a cost -type contract. This has definite advantages given the
rapid improvement in clean-up technology. With cost -type
contracts the government could encourage, or even direct, the
contractor to be innovative with these new technologies. If
the entire cost risk of performance rests on the contractor,
as with FFP contracts, he will be hesitant to experiment with
new technologies until they are proven. In the long run, this
will hurt the government.
a. Conclusions Concerning Contract Type
Due to the uncertain scope and price conditions
inherent in environmental restoration, especially up through
the design phase, the use of some form of cost -reimbursement
contract is clearly warranted. In situations with these major
uncertainties, a FFP contract would not be appropriate, and
would simply not fit.
If a FFP contract was forced in this situation, it
would have to be written in one of two ways. It would have
either a broad scope of work making the contractor responsible
for all uncertainties, or a scope which ignored them. If the
first option was used, the bids submitted would reflect many,
if not all, of the uncertainties which might be encountered.
Since contractors are considered risk averters, they would
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submit bids based on the worst case scenario. Since rarely
would all the uncertainties occur on one job, the government
would be overpaying for the work.
If the second option was used, the government would
have to pay for only those uncertainties which did actually
surface. Each one, however, would result in a contract
modification. This is an expensive and inefficient method of
contracting for work.
The underground, regulatory, and technological
uncertainties of the environmental area make it a perfect
candidate for the cost -reimbursement contract. This is an
area where the government should assume the cost risk of
performance. Use of a cost -reimbursement contract in this




A. TYPES OF COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS
There are five types of cost -reimbursement contracts.
Each of these will be discussed below. It should be noted
that there is no mention of a cost-plus-percentage-of -cost
contract. It is obvious that this type contract would provide
no incentive to minimize costs, and in fact would actually
provide a strong incentive to increase costs in an effort to
increase profits. The use of a cost-plus-a-percentage-of -cost
contract has therefor been strictly prohibited by the FAR
since World War I.
1. Cost Contract
With a cost contract, the government reimburses the
contractor for all allowable and allocable costs up to the
funding limit of the contract. There is no fee paid to the
contractor in a cost contract.
This type cost contract is used primarily for non-
profit educational institutions or facilities contracts.
Facilities contracts are contracts under which government
property is provided to the contractor for his use while
performing the contract work.
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2. Cost-Sharing Contract
Under a cost -sharing contract the contractor agrees to
work for no fee and for only a portion of the costs incurred.
A contractor would be willing to enter into an agreement of
this nature if he felt he would derive some benefit by doing
the work. This might be the case with an educational
institution or a company that feels there will be an
application for the product in the private sector.
3. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract
The cost-plus- fixed- fee (CPFF) contract allows the
contractor to be reimbursed for all allowable costs and a
negotiated fee. The fee is agreed upon before the contract is
signed and does not vary with actual costs. The fee can,
however, be adjusted as the result of changes in the scope of
the contract.
Because the fee is fixed and does not vary with the
contractor's performance, there is little incentive for the
contractor to control costs. The CPFF contract should
therefore be avoided if possible and only be used when
uncertainties involved in the work are so great that the level
of effort required can not be nailed down and the contractor
would not otherwise accept the risk.
It must also be impracticable to evaluate the
contractor's performance based on subjective measures. If
subjective measurement of contractor performance can be
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obtained, a cost-plus-award-fee contract is a better mechanism
for enticing the contractor to control costs.





The completion form directs the contractor to
perform a task. The contractor provides his best effort in
attempting to provide the product or service until the
contract is satisfied or all authorized funds have been spent.
If the work is not completed, the government has the right to
increase the estimated cost of the contract, and to direct the
contractor to continue work without increasing the fee.
b. Term
The term form (also called level-of -effort) directs
the contractor to provide a certain level of effort for a
specified time. The fee is paid to the contractor at the end
of the time period. To get the fee, the contractor only has
to show that he exerted the level of effort specified in the
contract. The government does not have the right to direct
the contractor to continue work under the term form. If the
government desires additional work, a new contract must be
negotiated with an additional fee. For this reason, the
completion form is preferred over the term form.
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4. Cost -Plus -Award- Fee Contract
A cost -plus -award- fee (CPAF) contract provides for the
reimbursement of all allowable costs, plus a fee. The fee
consists of two separate parts. The first is the base fee
which is a fixed amount set at the inception of the contract.
The base fee can range from zero to the regulatory limit of
three percent. The contractor is entitled to the base fee
portion of the award fee regardless of performance.
The second portion of the award fee is called the
award fee pool and is earned by the contractor during the life
of the contract. The amount of the award fee pool will vary,
but it should be sufficient to motivate the contractor. It is
limited only by the statutory regulations which limit the
maximum fee (base fee plus award fee pool) to 15 percent of
the estimated costs for experimental, developmental, or
research work and 10 percent for other work. The award fee
pool represents an additional fee available to reward the
contractor for performance above minimum standards. In this
way, it transforms the CPAF contract into an incentive
contract
.
The amount of the award fee pool given to the
contractor is determined by a subjective evaluation by the
government based on criteria contained in the contract. The
performance criteria will be different for each contract. The
important point is to provide criteria which will motivate the
contractor to be efficient. The government is the sole judge
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of how much of the award fee pool is given to the contractor.
The contractor has no legal recourse if he does not agree with
the amount
.
5. Cost-Plus- Incentive-Fee Contracts
The cost -plus -incentive- fee (CPIF) contract provides
for an initially negotiated fee which is adjusted up or down
with a formula based on the relationship between actual total
and targeted costs. After the contract work is performed, the
fee is determined by use of the formula. The fee will be
higher than the target fee if total costs are lower than
target costs. Conversely, the fee will be lower than the
target fee if total costs are above the target costs.
This type of contract is only appropriate if the
criteria used to determine the incentive fee can be measured
objectively. This will usually apply to hardware type
contracts, since measurement of services can rarely be done
objectively. The government must ensure that it knows what to
measure, how to measure it, and if the formula works to
encourage the desired behavior from the contractor.
B. WHICH TYPE OF COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACT SHOULD BE USED
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION?
Because a primary concern when using cost -reimbursement
contracts is how to best encourage cost conscious behavior by
the contractor, this should be one of the primary
considerations when picking the form of cost-plus contract.
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The basic cost contract, the cost sharing contract, and the
CPFF contract all provide either no fee or a pre -determined
fixed fee. It should be obvious that there is little the
government could do under any of these contracts, other than
threaten termination, which would provide a real incentive for
the contractor to control costs. These contracts are
therefore not appropriate for the huge environmental
restoration problem.
This leaves the two incentive type cost -reimbursement
contracts, the CPAF and CPIF. Both encourage some degree of
cost consciousness from the contractor. The critical
difference in this case is in how the fee is provided.
Under the CPIF contract, the fee is determined using a
negotiated fee which is adjusted up or down by applying a
formula which relates actual and targeted costs. A major
justification for the use of cost-type contracts for
environmental services, however, was that accurate cost
estimates could not be obtained.
In the environmental restoration field, the relationship
between actual and targeted cost may or may not reflect the
quality of the contractor's performance. When dealing with
the uncertainties discussed earlier, a project could easily
come in well over the initial estimate. This does not
necessarily mean that the contractor did not do a good job.
In fact, a project could overrun its budget as a result of
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unexpected problems even if a contractor was doing an
outstanding job of controlling costs. Under a CPIF contract,
this contractor would actually be penalized.
An incentive will only be effective if the contractor
believes that his performance will influence the amount of his
fee. This would not be the case if the CPIF contract was used
for providing environmental services. The CPIF contract
requires objective performance measures to be effective in
motivating the contractor. Because of the lack of objective
performance measurements in the environmental restoration
field and the fact that services are generally hard to measure
objectively, the CPIF contract would not be appropriate for an
area as ambiguous as environmental restoration.
The CPAF contract is designed to reward outstanding
contractor performance based on subjective evaluations by
those monitoring the job. It is therefor the cost -type
contract best suited to provide a real incentive for the
contractor working in the environmental area. Since the
contractor knows the amount of the award fee pool he receives
will be based on the subjective evaluation, he will endeavor
to excel in those areas being evaluated. If the evaluation
criteria include quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and
cost-effective management, these are the things the contractor
will work to optimize. In this way the award fee pool, none
of which is guaranteed to the contractor, will act as a real
incentive for excellence.
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For the reasons just discussed, the CPAF contract is the
best suited for the engineering services required for
environmental restoration. It both fits the unique nature of
this problem and provides the best chance of maximizing the




The advantages of a cost -reimbursement contract for the
engineering services needed for environmental restoration were
discussed in Chapter IV. Chapter V explained why the CPAF
contract is the best form of cost-type contract for this work.
NAVFAC evaluated this information, from many sources, and came
to the same conclusions in 1988. (Telephone Conversation with
Griffin, 23 August 1991) At that time, they made the decision
to develop the long term CPAF contract, now called CLEAN, for
the majority of the engineering and design services the Navy-
would need for environmental restoration during the 1990' s.
There were other considerations that played in NAVFAC
s
decision to use these long term CPAF contracts. A long term
cost -reimbursement contract provides some distinct advantages.
Three of these advantages are discussed below.
1 . CONTINUITY
A long term cost reimbursement contract for
environmental restoration has several advantages. It is more
economical to keep the same contractor on board rather than
re-educate another. In fact, NAVFAC found that prior to use
of CLEAN, the government was paying for multiple studies on
the same area because different contractors were being used.
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(Griffin, 1991, p. 7) If one contractor could be used under
a cost -reimbursement contract, a considerable amount of
duplication of effort could be avoided.
Working with the same contractor throughout a project
would also allow cradle to grave engineering services with one
firm. This would pin point liability, avoid the complications
of work handoffs between contractors, and save considerable
time and effort due to resolicitation between phases. These
advantages alone will result in considerable administrative
and cost savings while also avoiding years of bureaucratic
delays
.
Continuity would also help with the regulatory
process. (Zagrobelny, 1991, p. 26) Continued contact between
one contractor and the different regulatory agencies can
expedite the regulatory process. This avoids continual
repetition of the learning curve when dealing with
bureaucratic organizations, and, once contacts are
established, work should proceed more smoothly.
2. CONTRACTOR SELECTION
The use of a long term cost -reimbursement contract for
environmental restoration would also be much more attractive
to larger and more capable contractors. Until recently, the
largest and most experienced full service environmental
contracting firms have not been interested in DoD work.
(Bechtel, 1991, p. 1) One of the primary reasons was that
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they did not think that the rewards outweighed the risks.
Unless long term cost-plus contracts are utilized for DoD
environmental restoration, the government will have to settle
for smaller firms with limited experience and competence and
virtually no financial depth. (Bechtel, 1991, p.l) In the
long run, this will cost more and result in an inferior
finished product.
3. FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS
A long term cost -reimbursement contract would greatly
increase flexibility in the environmental area. As discussed
above, this type of contract might attract a much larger and
more capable contractor. These large contractors are the only
ones in the field with the full spectrum of environmental
services which will be required throughout the restoration
process
.
It has been asserted that each site will be different
and somewhat unique. A large contractor with a full spectrum
of services will be able to quickly and efficiently handle the
unique aspects of each job. Concurrently, however, use of the
same contractor will allow him to apply lessons learned from
earlier projects which did have similarities. These lessons
learned would be with both the actual field work and the
regulatory process.
The use of a long term CPAF contract may also make the
contractor much more responsive. Contractors working under a
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cost -type contract are typically more conscientious about
meeting basic contract requirements and more cooperative and
timely in responding to contractual direction. (Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization, 1984, p. 6) The government
would have more control over contractor effort and be able to
take immediate action to make the contractor more cost
effective. This would have a considerable impact on
responsiveness and help make any critical cleanup more timely.
In emergency situations, the existence of a standing contract,
with a responsive and capable contractor, would provide a
great benefit. Having immediate access to a contractor
capable of providing quick response remediation could easily
prevent a small spill from developing into a large and costly
one.
B. THE MORAL HAZARD ISSUE
As explained in Chapter III, there is a moral hazard issue
which must be addressed when dealing with cost -reimbursement
contracts. The problem is in how to provide incentives in the
contract which will overcome the moral hazard problem inherent
in a principle-agent relationship which insulates the
contractor (agent) from the risks of sub- standard performance.
The nature and unique features involved with engineering
services in the environmental restoration area requires the
risk sharing relationship provided by a cost -reimbursement
contract. This same risk sharing relationship, however, is
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exactly what insulates the contractor from his own sub-
standard performance. The question, therefor, is how to
encourage the contractor to act in a cost conscious and
responsible manner. While individuals within NAVFAC may not
have specifically addressed the issue of "moral hazard" when
they developed the CLEAN contract, they were well aware of the
incentive problem. CPAF contracts, and more specifically the
CLEAN contracts, are structured to provide the proper
incentives to the contractor.
There are three ways in which the CLEAN contract
specifically counters the potential moral hazard problem.
1. Award Fee Pool
The most obvious incentive for the contractor is the
award fee pool. The contractor will receive all, part, or
none of the award fee pool based on a subjective evaluation by
the government. The criteria used to evaluate the contractor
are contained in the contract and are designed to encourage
quality, timeliness, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness.
(Telephone conversation with Griffin, 23 August 1991) As long
as the contractor believes that his performance will affect
the amount of the award fee pool he receives, he will be
motivated to excel in the areas targeted by the performance
criteria.
Technical monitoring is critical to the success of the
incentive behind the award fee pool. Technical monitoring is
51
the only way the government can determine the quality of the
contractor's performance. It is impossible for a contracting
officer or financial analyst sitting back in an office to
evaluate contractor performance. The fact that a job overruns
is no indication of poor contractor performance. If it was,
there would be little justification for the use of a cost-type
contract in the first place. Only technical monitoring of the
contractor can provide the evaluation needed to encourage
desired behavior.
Take, for example, the situation where the contractor
is drilling test wells during a remedial investigation. If
the average depth of wells has been approximately 150 feet, a
cost conscious contractor should attempt to utilize the
smallest rig capable of getting the job done. 4 If the
contractor takes a 200 foot rig to the site and does not hit
water by 200 feet, he will have to demobilize the rig, bring
out a larger one, and remobilize it to finish the job. This,
however, does not necessarily imply that the contractor used
bad judgement. If only five percent of the wells are deeper
than 200 feet, it would not be cost effective to bring a 300
foot drill rig to every job.
transportation and mobilization of larger drilling
equipment, capable of going deeper into the ground, is
significantly more expensive. A cost conscious contractor
should weigh the cost of each size rig with the expected depth
of the well.
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The contractor in the above situation should not be
penalized for not hitting water by 200 feet. Technical
monitoring in the field is the only way to evaluate the job
the contractor does in this situation. A financial analyst
might look at the overrun caused by the transportation and
mobilization of two drilling rigs as an indication of poor
cost control. Technical monitoring, on the other hand, might
show that the contractor did an outstanding job controlling
costs once the unforeseeable condition was encountered, and
actually prevented an even greater overrun. In this case, the
contractor should be given a large portion of the award fee
pool, and not penalized for the overrun itself.
This point is important because for any incentive to
work as intended, the contractor must believe that his actions
will affect his profit. If the contractor in the above
example felt that his performance was going to be based solely
on the cost of the job relative to the estimate, he would
estimate and take the largest rig possible to every job site.
It should be obvious that in that situation, the government
would be overpaying
.
for the majority of wells and cost
efficiency would not be encouraged.
2. Option Years
The second way the CLEAN contract attempts to counter
moral hazard is with the use of option years. The contractor
is guaranteed only one year of work, with the nine option
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years available if the Navy finds them desirable. The Navy
can terminate the contract at any time after the first year by
not exercising the next option year. The fact that each CLEAN
has an estimated value of between $100 and $130 million should
motivate the contractor to perform in a way that will ensure
the Navy exercises each of the nine option years.
In order for the option years to serve as a motivation
for efficient and effective performance, however, they must
provide the contractor with adequate compensation
possibilities. While $130 million is a large sum of money,
the contractor is more concerned with his own return or
profit. Contractors are not in the business to simply turn
money. They want to make a profit. Each option year must
therefore provide the contractor with an opportunity to obtain
a satisfactory level of profit. This means that the total
award fee must be high enough to motivate the contractor. If
the contractor does not feel that the profit he is obtaining
from the CLEAN contract is adequate, he will not be motivated
to encourage the Navy to exercise the next option year. If
cost efficiency is a performance criteria the Navy is using to
decide if the next option year should be exercised, the
contractor will make no effort in this area.
An important consideration when evaluating the level
of compensation which will motivate the contractor is the
competitive nature of the environmental field today. Due to
the rapid increase in emphasis on environmental compliance,
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the market has not been able to keep up with demand for
professionals trained in this field. There is an unmet demand
for competent environmental services for all phases in the
restoration process. Many private business and state agencies
are also bidding for the services of the limited personnel and
firms trained in environmental restoration. This means that
if the compensation the CLEAN is providing contractors is not
just fair, but also comparable to that available from other
sources, the contractor will not be motivated to encourage
exercising of the option years.
3 . Performance Evaluations
The last means by which the CLEAN counters the moral
hazard problem is through the use of performance evaluations
which are placed into a nation wide data base. (Telephone
conversation with Griffin, 23 August 1991) This data base can
be accessed by all of DoD as well as any federal, state, and
local government agency which is considering environmental
work. If this data base is used as planned, it will provide
a considerable incentive to contractors. There will be a
large number of agencies querying the data base for contractor
evaluations before they make contract awards. This will
provide a real incentive for contractors to ensure only good
evaluations are even put in the system. Contractors will do
this be trying to excel in the areas the government feels are
important; which is the goal of the incentive.
55
This is another area where market forces (the shortage
of qualified firms and personnel in this field) could
undermine the benefits of this incentive. If contractors
perceive the demand for services as far exceeding the supply,
some may be less concerned with the evaluations they do get.
Considering the wide range of agencies using this data base,
however, it can be assumed that it will provide a significant
incentive for above average contractor performance.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
From the discussion and analysis in this thesis, it
appears that NAVFAC made the correct decision in developing
the CLEAN contracts utilizing long term CPAF contracts. Work
in the environmental restoration field, especially in the
engineering and design phases, encompasses a wide variety of
activities which do not lend themselves to the traditional
forms of contracting used by NAVFAC.
The inability to accurately define the scope and price of
work in environmental restoration requires the use of some
form of cost -reimbursement contract. Trying to make FFP
contracts fit in this area would have many negative
ramifications. Three of the most serious would be more
expensive contracts, smaller and less capable contractors
willing to accept the risk, and a large increase in contract
modifications and litigations. This conclusion is made
without the benefit of an actual cost -benefit analysis. It
is, however, based on a detailed study of the unique nature of
the environmental restoration field.
NAVFAC s choice of the CPAF contract provides an excellent
balance between the risk sharing arrangement and the
incentives for outstanding performance by the contractor. It
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does this by addressing the moral hazard/incentive problem
inherent in cost -reimbursement contracts. The award fee and
the way it is earned by the contractor provides a very strong
incentive for above average performance. In addition, the
nine option years and the performance evaluation data base
provide two other strong incentives to perform in the best
interests of the government.
Overall, the CPAF contract appears to do an outstanding
job of protecting the contractor from risks he would not, and
should not, be expected to assume. At the same time, however,
it provides a very good set of incentives to motivate the
contractor to perform in a way that is both economical and in
the best interests of the government.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
The CLEAN contract seems to be well suited for both the
unique aspects of environmental remediation and the concerns
contractors have about risk in this new and developing field.
The contracting question has been addressed and answered.
There remains, however, one aspect that is crucial to the
success of every CLEAN contract which has been awarded. That
item is technical monitoring and the role it plays in the
evaluation of the contractor. Complete monitoring is
impossible due to financial and personnel restrictions. It
must always be remembered, however, that no single action will
reduce information asymmetry as much as technical monitoring
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of the contract. Reducing this information asymmetry will do
more than any other single action in controlling the moral
hazard problem.
The incentives built into the CPAF contracts will be
almost useless if the government does not use technical
monitoring as the powerful tool it is. All three of the
incentive measures built into the CLEAN require a technical,
and not just financial, evaluation of the contractor's
performance. If the contractor ever feels that they are being
evaluated on simply the relationship between the estimated
cost, which is a rough guess, and the actual costs, then
overall quality, technical ingenuity, timeliness, and cost-
efficient management will all suffer. It is critical for the
government to recognize this fact and provide the assets
needed to properly monitor the work while it is underway.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The question of moral hazard, how it can effect a cost-
reimbursement contract, and how to provide incentives in these
contracts have all been only briefly covered in this thesis.
Extensive additional study could be undertaken in any one of
the above areas
.
The moral hazard effect associated with the different
types of contract is another area for additional study. The
question of contractor motivation, with imperfect information,
under different contract types was mentioned. A more in-depth
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study of this question and the moral hazard/incentive issue
would be useful in this area.
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